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A Tribute to Justice Stewart G. Pollock
Howard M. Enchson *
Stewart Pollock knows how to make a play. On his favorite kind
of court - the kind with a net in the middle - he can set up the
winning volley with a perfectly placed approach shot. On the court
on which he served for the past twenty years, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, Justice Pollock proved himself an equally gifted playmaker,
earning a reputation as one who could forge consensus through
judicial craftsmanship and common sense.
Appellate judging is a team sport, though one would hardly
know it by looking at recent United States Supreme Court cases, with
all their dissents, concurrences, and fractured opinions. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, in contrast, has managed to offer many
unanimous decisions, even when breaking new ground or dealing
with political hot-button issues.' The court has accomplished this
unanimity despite New Jersey's tradition of maintaining a Democrat-
Republican split among the justices.! Justice Pollock was at the center
Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. BA, Harvard
University, 1985; J.D., New York University, 1990. Professor Erichson served as law
clerk to justice Pollock during the 1990-1991 term.I See, e.g., Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999)
(holding that Boy Scouts have no right to exclude a scoutmaster on grounds of
homosexuality, in opinion by Chief Justice Poritz endorsed by six justices and "fully
endorse [d]" by concurring Justice Handler); State v. One 1990 Honda Accord, 154
N.J. 373, 712 A.2d 1148 (1998) (upholding right to jury trial in forfeiture action
involving property used for criminal purposes without owner's permission, in
unanimous opinion by Justice Pollock); Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359
(1990) (holding NewJersey's school funding system unconstitutional as applied to
poorer urban school districts, in unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Wilentz); In re
Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (holding surrogate motherhood contract
illegal and discussing parental rights in wake of surrogacy arrangement, in
unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Wilentz); Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (imposing broad remedial scheme
for provision of low-income housing opportunities, in unanimous opinion by Chief
Justice Wilentz).
2 By long-standing tradition, the New Jersey Supreme Court's seven members
never include more than four from the same political party. Thus, for example,
Republican Governor Christine Whitman recently appointed Democrat Virginia
Long to the court to maintain the current balance of four Republicans and three
Democrats. Similarly, Stewart Pollock, a Republican, was appointed by Democratic
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of the court on many of these decisions, not only by virtue of his
political sensibilities, but also by virtue of his approach to judging.
His opinions routinely are included in law school casebooks for their
clarity and intelligence.' A textbook admirer of Pollock opinions,
however, might miss another of their signature qualities - their
collegiality.
As telling as Justice Pollock's unanimous opinions, which are
many, are his concurrences and dissents, which are few. He never, as
far as I can tell, wrote a concurrence or a dissent merely to wax
eloquent on an interesting legal issue. Justice Pollock wrote
separately only where he saw some compelling reason to do so.
Generally, an unfractured opinion offers both the litigants and the
public clearer guidance, and enhances the court's legitimacy and
respect in the eyes of the citizenry and in coordinate branches of the
government. Not only is Justice Pollock's majority-to-dissent ratio
notably high,' his concurrences are exceptionally rare. Looking at his
frequent unanimous opinions, his infrequent dissents, and his even
less frequent concurrences, one gets an overall impression of the
judge. The impression is that of a judge who can build a coalition to
ensure unanimity or at least a majority, who is willing to state a
dissent on those occasions when his position is irreconcilable with the
majority position, but who rarely writes an opinion merely to offer
another point of view.
Governor Brendan Byrne.3 See, e.g., BARBARA BABCOCK & TOM MASSARO, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1105 (1997)
(reprinting Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398, 591 A.2d 592
(1991) (Pollock, J.) (addressing the claim-preclusive effect of a federal court
judgment)); DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS 281 (1992) (reprinting Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr. v. County of Essex, 111
N.J. 67, 543 A.2d 34 (1988) (Pollock, J., concurring) (addressing the duty of a county
to pay for the hospitalization costs of an indigent county jail inmate)); JESSE CHOPER
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 82 (4th ed. 1995) (reprinting Francis
v. United Jersey Bank, 87 NJ. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981) (Pollock,J.) (addressing the
duties of corporate directors)); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERs: PROBLEMS
OF LAw AND ETHICS 733 (5th ed. 1998) (reprinting Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J.
472, 655 A.2d 1354 (1995) (Pollock, J.) (addressing lawyer liability to non-clients));
ARTHUR LAFRANE, BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW 743
(1999) (reprinting Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (Pollock, J.)
(addressing tort action for wrongful life)).See Tim O'Brien, Pollock: Pragmatist at the Court's Center, 151 N.J. L.J. at 230-31
(Jan. 19, 1998) (noting Justice Pollock's high majority-to-dissent ratio of 3.52:1);
Kathleen Bird et al., Reconstructing New Jersey, 130 N.J. L.J. at 453 (Feb. 17, 1992)
(noting Justice Pollock's majority-to-dissent ratio of 6:1 for the years 1979-1991, the
highest ratio on the court by a significant margin); Kathleen Bird, As Pollock Goes, So
Goes the Court, 130 N.J. L.J. at 442 (Feb. 17, 1992) ("His ratio of signed unanimous
opinions to dissents is the highest on the Court.").
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In a 1996 lecture entitled The Art ofJudging, Justice Pollock noted
that 'judging, particularly in hard cases, is unavoidably creative."5
Creativity and flexibility are required to craft judicial opinions that
not only do justice, but also command a majority of the court, as well
as the respect of the community. Examples from two very different
areas of law help to show the playmaking ability, flexibility, and plain
old common sense thatJustice Pollock brought to his judging.
In Francis v. United Jersey Bank,6 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held a corporate director liable for negligently allowing her sons to
siphon funds from the corporation.7 Justice Pollock's straightforward
statement of the duties of corporate directors8 is widely viewed as a
governing standard.9 Equally impressive, however, is the way that he
crafted the opinion to attract the court's unanimous approval, as well
as the common-sense justice of the outcome. As a matter of judicial
craftsmanship, the opinion included both a statement of legal
principles expressed in broad enough terms to give judges, lawyers,
and corporate directors useful guidance,'0 and enough factual
specificity to offer future judges and lawyers some flexibility to
distinguish Francis from their own case when necessary." As a matter
of common-sense justice, the court's decision had the effect of
punishing the primary wrongdoers. The case involved the liability of
5 Stewart G. Pollock, TheArt ofJudging, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 591,593 (1996).
6 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
7 See id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 829.
See id. at 31, 432 A.2d at 822. The justice stated:
Directors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about
the activities of the corporation. Otherwise, they may not be able to
participate in the overall management of corporate affairs. Directors
may not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and then claim that
because they did not see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to
look. The sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing to the
enterprise he is charged to protect.
Id. (citations omitted).9 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, comment to § 4.01 (a) (1)-(a) (2); ROBERT CHARLES
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4.1 at 125 n.9 (1986);JAMES D. COXET AL., CORPORATIONS
§ 10.5 at 189-90 (1997).10 See Francis, 87 N.J. at 31-35, 432 A.2d at 822-24 (stating the obligations of
cororate directors as a general matter).In particular, Justice Pollock's opinion suggested a possible distinction
between a small, closely held corporation and a large, publicly held corporation, and
emphasized that certain close corporations may "be affected with a public interest."
Id. at 35, 432 A.2d at 824. The opinion went on to discuss the particular character of
the reinsurance industry, and the special trust placed in the directors of a
reinsurance brokerage corporation, by analogy to the duties of bank directors. See id.
at 37-39, 432 A.2d at 825-26.
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the negligent director, rather than of the embezzling sons who took
advantage of her,2 but the director herself had died before trial.
Imposing liability on her estate presumably took money from two
likely beneficiaries - the embezzling sons. Although the legal
standard for directors' liability may take no account of such a plot
twist, I assume that the plain justice of the outcome was not lost on
Justice Pollock, nor on his unanimous colleagues.
Even in the most technical aspects of the law, Justice Pollock
kept his eye on the practical impact of the court's decisions. A
compulsory party joinder rule known as the entire controversy
doctrine, for example, was applied ever more expansively by the New
Jersey Supreme Court from the late 1980s through the mid-1990s,
culminating in 1995 in the application of the doctrine to legal
malpractice claims.' The doctrine was problematic to begin with, but
was especially troubling as applied to malpractice claims. Justice
Pollock, in a 1996 opinion, acknowledged that the doctrine had
attracted criticism from the bar. 4 A year later, in Olds v. Donnelly,15
Justice Pollock wrote that rarest of judicial documents: an opinion
that admits that the court made a mistake. "Candor compels that we
acknowledge that the application of the entire controversy doctrine
to legal-malpractice claims has not fulfilled our expectations," Justice
Pollock wrote. 6 The court unanimously overruled the application of
the doctrine to malpractice claims, 7 and requested a re-examination
of the entire controversy doctrine by the Civil Practice Committee.'
Through careful drafting and a wise referral to committee, Justice
Pollock accomplished the right result with a minimum of fuss. It
could have been - and on another court probably would have been
- an acrimonious battle among the justices. Instead, Justice Pollock
and his colleagues achieved the correction of an unfortunate twist of
doctrine with impressive swiftness, honesty, and lack of defensiveness.
Justice Pollock never lost sight of the importance of each
12 Both of the sons had filed individual bankruptcy petitions. See Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 162 N.J. Super. 355, 365, 392 A.2d 1233, 1237 (Law Div. 1978).13 See Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 291, 662 A.2d
509, 513 (1995).14 See Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 180, 191-92, 678 A.2d 243, 248-49 (1996).
6 150 N.J. 424, 696 A.2d 633 (1997).
16 Id. at 440, 696 A.2d at 641.
7 justice Stein wrote separately. He agreed that legal malpractice claims should
not be subject to compulsory party joinder under the entire controversy doctrine,
but would have gone further to reject altogether the entire controversy doctrine's
compulsory party joinder component. See id. at 473, 696 A.2d at 658 (Stein, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18 See Olds, 150 N.J. at 446, 449, 696 A.2d at 644, 646.
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decision on human beings, including not only the particular litigants
in the case, but also the other citizens whose lives are affected by the
court's decisions. "In today's world, state courts are the catchers in
the rye,"'9 Justice Pollock said in a recent lecture, alluding to the J.D.
Salinger novel in which Holden Caulfield imagines himself in a field
of rye catching children before they fall off a cliff. "For so many
people," Justice Pollock continued, "state courts are all that stands
between them and the edge of the cliff.""
In The Art of Judging, Justice Pollock asked, "Does anyone really
want judges to be devoid of imagination, good sense, courage, and
compassion?"" The citizens of New Jersey, lucky to have had ajustice
with the imagination, good sense, courage, and compassion of
Stewart Pollock, should be able to answer with an emphatic "no."
19 Stewart G. Pollock, Layers and Judges as Catchers in the Rye, 34 TuLsA LJ. 1, 3
(1998).
20 Id.
21 Pollock, supra note 5, at 594.
